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custom, is not competent to disprove the existence of such custom.'
Nor to disprove a custom which would release him from a pecuniary
burden.2 But the cases are far too numerous to be cited, and the
above are sufficient for illustration.'
§ 50. It may be added, that the rule which makes a person incompetent who is interested in a record, applies also to criminal cases.
Thus an accessory before or after the fact is not competent to testify
for the principal. 4 So where several are indicted for a conspiracy,
the wife of one is not admissible for another.'

In the Supreme Court of Texas-Tyler (April) Term, 1859.
THE STATE OF TEXAS VS. THE SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY.

1. The constitution of Texas provides that the legislature may revoke and repeal
the charters of all private corporations, by making compensation for the franchise;
this provision is not to be construed into a limitation upon thcpower of the State
confining it to that mode of revocation alone.
2. A general or special statute, directing a suit to be brought for a forfeiture, is
unnecessary in order that the will of the State may be known as to whether a
forfeiture will be claimed or not.
3. The common law remedy of quo warranto is adopted in Texas.
4. The district attorney, who is a State officer and charged with the duty of prosecuting all actions in which the State is interested, is bound to institute a quo
warranto for the forfeiture of a charter of a corporation, when the law has declared
that upon the happening of certain events, or the omission of certain things, cause
of forfeiture has arisen, and the franchise ought to be reclaimed by the sovereign.
5. A law which provides that after a certain date a majority of the officers of railroad corporations shall reside within the State granting the franchise, under
penalty of forfeiture of the charter in case of non-compliance, is constitutional,

I The Carpenters of S. vs. Haywood, I Doug. 374.
2Rhodes vs. Ainsworth, 1 B. & Ald. 87.
3See 1 Greenlf. Ev. a 390, 394, 404, 405 ; 1 Phil. Ev. 83, 84.
41 Stark. Ev. 130; 2 Russ. on Crimes, P02; 1 Phill. Ev. 61-68.
It would seem there might be an exception in some criminal cases to the rule that
the interest which renders a person incompetent is essentiallyypecuniaryin its nature
ante,
21, 29, notes.
5 Rex vs. Rocker, 5 Esp. 107.
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does not impair the obligation of a contract, and may be enforced against a corporation chartered and organized before its passage.
6. Definition of franchise.
7. "1The obligation of a contract" discussed, and authorities cited.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
RODERTS,

J.-This is a suit in the nature of a quo warranto

instituted by the State of Texas against the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, claiming a forfeiture of its charter, upon various
grounds specified in the petition and amended petitions.
Exceptions general and special were filed to the petition, and
sustained by the court below.
The first and most prominent objection to the action is the want
of authority on the part of the attorney general of the State and
district attorney of the district, whose names are signed to the
petition, to bring the suit in the name of the State. It is contended
that the State, acting in its legislative capacity, has not authorized
such a suit to be brought, either by any general law or special
enactment; and that without such authority, it cannot be maintained;
that the State not having in any manner manifested its wish to proceed against this corporation, the attorney general and district
attorney, or any other person, have no right to use the name of the
State in prosecuting this suit, as they have done.
This objection does not seek to call in question the right of these
officers to use the name of the State in prosecuting and defending
ordinary actions in which the State has an interest against individuals or corporations. But it assumes that this is an extraordinary proceeding, involving the "life of the corporation ;" that as
the State, through its legislative department alone, can call it
into existence, so it alone can direct a suit for forfeiture. Or
admitting that the constitution does not confine this power alone
to the legislature, then it assumes that the judiciary cannot
decree a forfeiture of its charter, and the attorney general and
district attorney cannot bring a suit for that purpose, unless the
legislature has by some general or special statute authorized and
directed a suit for forfeiture to be instituted. If either of. these
propositions be correct, the suit cannot be maintained; because
we have no such statute.
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It will be proper to consider these propositions separately, as they
involve very different questions, though embraced in the same

objection.
The first is based on the section in the "general provisions" of
the constitution, which says that " two thirds of the legislature shall
have power to revoke and repeal all private corporations by making
compensation for the franchise." Hart. Dig. p. 74.
The history of corporations in the United States exhibits the
increasing tendency of capital to seek employment under their protection, as the only avenue left in this country of equal rights, to
special and exclusive privileges; and the most persistent efforts
have been made to assert, maintain and perpetuate those privileges,
in entire independence of the power and control of the State
creating them, by appealing to the federal judiciary.
Corporations have ever contested the right of eminent domain in
the State, and claimed an exemption from the operation of this high
power, to which all other property is subject. To forestall in part
such pretensions, this clause was inserted in the constitution. It is
intended as a direct assertion of supremacy by the State over them
at discretion, subject only to the conditions of a two-thirds vote of
the legislature, and the payment for the franchise revoked.
This well considered precautionary declaration of a reserved permanent right, cannot be construed into a limitation upon the power
of the State, confining it to that mode of revocation alone; for there
can be no reason to suppose that it was intended that chartered
privileges which should be abused or let go into disuse, should be
paid for, or be protected by requiring a vote of two-thirds of the
legislature to get rid of that which may have utterly failed to accomplish the object of its creation.
The other proposition, that there must be a statute directingsuch
a suit, is founded upon some supposed sacredness in the rights of a
corporation, beyond that which is attached to the rights of other
persons. It is not contended that such a statute is necessary to
enable the attorney for the State to bring suits for debts and penalties against individuals. There is no provision in our constitution
which places the rights of a corporation upon higher ground than
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those of other persons.

It is only by a sort of legal fiction, in

regarding them as artificial persons, citizens of the State where
created, that they are entitled to the protection of the constitution.
Hart. Dig. 58, § 16.
Every grant of a private corporation confers privileges and immunities not enjoyed than of common right by the citizen; which cannot
be justififfd otherwise upon a supposed consideration of some direct
or indirect public benefit. Hart. Dig. 50, § 2 of bill of rights.
It is upon that principle that privileges and immunities are conferred on the officers of the State. In cases of usurpation, or when
they forfeit their privileges, proceedings may be instituted against
them in some tribunal of the State, without enacting a statute for
that purpose. They cannot claim that they hold their offices by a
tenure above responsibility to all other departments of the government, except the sovereign legislative power. No, citizen can claim
exemption from responsibility to other departments in reference to
his common rights, rights which should be the better protected
because they are common to all citizens.
What, then, is the foundation of this claim of a. corporation to the
additional exclusive privilege, over and above the rights of *citizens
and officers, of being responsible alone to the legislative department
in determining and directing a forfeiture?
It is said that the State may waive a forfeiture; that it may not
choose to exact it, though the cause of forfeiture prescribed by law
may exist; that there is always a discretion to be exercised by the
State involving a great question of policy, whether the forfeiture
shall be claimed or not, which discretion still rests and abides in
the sovereign power, the legislature, as it has not been given by
statute to the executive or judiciary, or to any officer of either of
these departments.
The error of this position, it is believed, consists in the assumption that a general or special statute directing a suit or forfeiture to
be brought, is necessary, in order that the will of the State may be
known, as to whether or not a forfeiture shall be claimed ; for whenever the State declares, by its legislature, that a particular act of
mal-feasance or non-feasance, done by a corporation or its officers,
6
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shall be a forfeiture of its charter, the discretion is then exercised,
and the will of the State that the forfeiture shall be claimed is then
expressed. Such. expression of its will continues in full force until
it is revoked by the legislature. It is obligatory, and imposes a
duty upon all the officers of the State who execute or administer the
law. Those officers cannot suspend the law. Laws are made to be
executed against those who infract them, and not to be* held suspended in terrorem. The Constitution has anticipated this, and
provided for it by saying in the bill of rights that "no power' of
suspending laws in this State shall be exercised except.by the legislature or its authority." Hart. Dig. 58, § 20.
It cannot be presumed that the legislature would make an act a
cause of forfeiture which did not, in its judgment, involve such an
abuse or dereliction as to merit a revocation of the franchise. Nor
can it be said that it does not wish a forfeiture to be enforced as the
legal consequence of such abuse or dereliction, when it has so
declared it shall be.
When such a law has been passed the only questions are, has the
law furnished a remedy to enforce it ? and are these officers appointed upon whom the duty devolves to enforce it ? - The will of
the State, that it ought to be and shall be enforced, is expressed in
the passage of the law.
In the adoption of the common law we adopted the rhmedy of
quo warranto against corporations. From that system we derive
the attributes and responsibilities of a corporation when created.
1 blackstone, 467, 485; Dallas, 507; 2 Tex. R. 158; 4 Tex. 406;
5 Wheaton, 291.
The Governor, Attorney General and District Attorney, are all
executive officers, each acting in their appropriate sphere. Of the
Governor, the Constitution says : "The supreme executive power
of this State shall be vested in the chief magistrate, who shall be
styled the Governor of the State of Texas." Hart. Dig. 64. "He
shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed."
Hart.
Dig. 66.
The Constitution, after providing for their appointment, prescribes that "the duties, salaries and perquisites of the attorney
general and district attorneys, shall be prescribed by law." Hart.
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Dig. 63 and 84. The statute makes it the "duty of the attorney
general to prosecute and defend all actions in the Supreme Court
of the State in which the State may be interested, and also to perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the Constitution and
laws of the State." Hart. Dig. 104. The statute makes it the
duty of the district attorney to attend all terms of the District
Court, "to conduct all prosecutions for crimes and offences cognizable in such court, to prosecute and defend all other actionsin which
tis State is -nterested, and to perform such other duties as may be
prescribed by the Constitution and laws of the State." Hart.
Dig. 226.
In England the king could direct and control the bringing of
suits by his direct control over the officer who might be attorney
general. In this State such direct control as a legal power is cut
off by the independence of the law officers of the State. Still it
does not follow that all official connection is severed between the
supreme executive officer of the State and those who represent the
State in our courts.
The power of the governor may be advisory, or suggestive of
duty in this case, as it is in many of his functions. And although
absolute subjection does not exist, harmony between executive officers, who are impelled by a common duty, is to be expected generally,
unless a difference of opinion should exist as to the proper course to
be pursued. That is an inconvenience which is consequent upon
maintaining the independence of the inferior officers. Its only effect
may be to prevent suits from being brought occasionally which might
otherwise be brought.
- But this want of subjection, and the consequent possibility of a
want of harmony in executive officers, do not affect the question of
right to maintain the suit. It is the duty imposed by law on the
officer, who must bring the suit, that constitutes the right to bring
and maintain it.
The district attorney, as we have seen, is required, as a duty
imposed on him, to prosecute all actions in which this State is interested, in the District Court. Bringing the action, by filing a petition, is a part of its prosecution. There is no limitation to his duty
in prosecuting suits in the District Court, but the interest of the
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State. This is an "action in which this State is interested." It
has by a charter vested certain franchises in a railroad company.
These constitute property previously belonging to the State, which,
by the grant, is now possessed and enjoyed by the company. The
State has declared by its laws that upon the happening of certain
events, or the omission of certain things, this property, the franchise, shall be forfeited. The State is interested, in a legal sense,
that it shall be forfeited, if the contingency has happened. It is
interested, because the company has property of the State, (the
franchise,) and the consideration of the grant has failed, or the condition upon which it was granted has been broken. The State is
interested in reclaiming and recovering its own, whether it be a forfeited franchise, a penalty, a debt, or other property. The district
attorney has as much right to bring the suit in one case as in the
other. His only warrant in either case is that the State is interested.
It is no answer to this to say, that the district attorney must
exercise an important privilege, in determining when the right of
the State to bring the action has accrued. That must be determined in all suits brought by him, on bonds of officers, in debts due
to the State, penalties incurred, informations, and all other suits
not specifically directed by statute. This same privilege would
have to be exerted by him, if this duty was imposed on him by a
statute directing such a suit, and defining the contingency upon
which it must be .brought.
This privilege arises out of the very nature of an executive office,
and is an incident to its duties. Establish the duty, and the incident follows. Duty gives the command and the powers to act,
and necessarily confers the right to determine the necessity or propriety of action. Whether the suit be brought at the instance of
the legislature, the governor, attorney general, or district attorney,
this preliminary right has to be exercised by some one. The legislature may direct who shall exercise it, but until such direction is
given, it is a power necessarily involved in the duty of that officer,
who is required to prosecute all, actions, in which the State is interested. Whoever must exercise this preliminary right its exercise isnot conclusive; for the facts that determine the forfeiture
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must be ascertained through the judiciary, "by due course of the
law of the land." Hart. Dig. 53.
It is unnecessary to comment on the respective powers of the
attorney general and the district attorney, as they have joined in
bringing this action. While our statutes seem designed to make a
division of powers and duties between them, in representing the interests of the State in the several courts, they evidently contemplate
a correspondence for advice and information between them. So far
as their duties are expressed in the statute, it seems to fall more
appropriately within the province of the district attorney to prosecute this or any other suit for the. State, in the District Court.
There are very few statutes requiring the district attorney specially
to bring suits for the State. 'They most usually indicate that suits
are to be brought and defended in the District Court, leaving it to
be determined from the nature of his office and the province and
scope of his duty, that he will act as the attorney for the State.
An instance of that kind is to be found in the. act of the legislature of 1857, in which provision is made for " special proceedThis act authorizes suits
ings against railroad companies."
or prosecutions against railroad corporations for -willful neglect
of duty, as prescribed by law. They are to be brouiht in the
name of the State, in the District Court of any county through
which said road may pass, or at the point of its commencement or
termination, and are to be regulated by the rules which govern civil
suits, in the pleading, process and trial; and still there is not the
slightest reference as to whom is entrusted the right to determine
the propriety of bringing the suit, or as to the particular officer who
shall prosecute it. It is provided, in the same connection, that this
shall have "no reference to cases where any act or omission of a railroad company operates as a surrender or forfeiture of its charter."
From this it is contended, that the legislature intended to withhold the pbwer to prosecute for forfeiture of the charter. It is
believed that the object of this enactment was to provide adequate
remedies for breaches of duty, in counties where they happened,
whether that should be where the company had its principal office
or not. The implication drawn from this enactment cannot be that
the district attorney shall not bring the suit of forfeiture, for he
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is not mentioned in it. IT it is to be indulged at all, it is a prohibition against bringing the suit by any one for the State. Neither
the woras or spirit of the enactment require such a construction.
For the last six or eight years the legislature have been enacting
laws creating and regulating railroads, and during that time have
repeatedly, in the most deliberate legislation, provided, that upon
the commission and omission of certain acts, their charter should
be forfeited. These are vain and idle threats, if during all this
time, the power has been reserved by the legislature from those
whose duty requires them to execute the laws. It would require a
plain and positive enactment to justify a conclusion so unusual in
reference to laws generally, so inconsistent with the repeated acts
of the legislature, and so far out of harmony with the principle of
our government, that law holds the sceptre of rule over all alike,
ever ready to strike down those who violate, and to support those
who obey its commands.
If we look beyond our own State, we find nothing in the decisions
of our sister States, which favors the view that the right to bring
this action is not vested in the attorney general or district attorney;
but on the contrary much, inferrentially, to establish that it is the
judicial sentiment of the whole country, that such a right does exist,
where it is not expressly reserved. Com. vs. Powler, 10 Mass. R.
290; Angell & Ames, 756, and cases cited; N,oor vs. Ligon,
19 Ala., 314.
However much.credit may be due to corporations, in developing
the resources of the country, in the various industrial pursuits, it
would be a strange doctrine to be recognized as existing in our
government, that an artificial person, created by the State, "without soul," and without body, except by legal intendment, should not
be responsible to the laws of the State, to be executed against them,
as they are executed against citizens, in whom is vested the sovereign power, and whose rights are specially protected by'the fundamental law of the land.
We think the objection that neither the attorney general nor district attorney had a right to use the name of the State in bringing
this suit, is not tenable. WVe think, also, that there is one good
ground of forfeiture properly alleged in the amended petition;
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that is the failure of the President or Vice President, and a maiority of the Directors of the railroad corporation, to reside in this
State after the 19th of June, 1858, as required by the Act of 1857,
(7th Legislature, 26.)
By that act it is provided, "that at least a majority of the
Directors, and the President or Vice President, Treasurer, and
Secretary, of every railroad company entitled to the benefits and
privileges of jn act entitled "An Act to encourage the construction
of railroads by a donation of land," approved January 30th, 1854,
or of "An act to provide for the investment of the special school
fund," passed August 13th, 1856, shall reside within the State of
Texas. The period of six months was allowed for this section of
the act to be complied with; and if not complied with in that
time, it was declared that "the charter of said company should be
forfeited."
It has not been denied that this railr6ad company belongs to the
class of roads referred to in this section, entitled to the benefit of
the loan and donation of lands under these statutes. The objection
raised to this ground of forfeiture simply is, that the law of 1857,
imposing this duty upon the officers of the company, is unconstitutional and void as to this company. This law was passed not only
after the grant of the charter, but after the full organization of the
company under it. And it is contended, that if effect b.e given to
this subsequent act of the Legislature, it will impair the obligation
of the contract contained in the charter made between the State
and the company. The same objection is taken to the first ground
of forfeiture, that the company had failed, after notice, to make a
report to the office of the Controller of the State.
This raises the question of how far railroad corporations may be
regulated and controlled by enactments of the Legislature of the
State, passed after the grant of the charter. There is nothing said
in the charter about where the President, Vice President or Directors shall reside, or about a report of the transactions of the company being made to the controller, or any other officer of the
State. The laws requiring these things, as it is contended, add
new stipulations to the contract, which do not bind the company, as
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they have not consented to them. This is founded on the fallacious
view that the charter is a contract, as between two private persons,
containing all the terms of the agreement, and that the State has
no right to do anything in relation to the terms or subject matter
of the contract, which will require the company to do anything
which is not required of it by the charter. The correct view of the
subject is, that the charter is a grant of franchises by the State, and
the rights granted to the company are limited by %thecharter.
They have a right to be a corporate body-that is, a franchise;
they have a right to construct a public railroad, and charge for its
use; (incidental powers are conferred to accomplish these objects;)
these constitute a franchise. These franchises are the private property of the company. As such, it is subject to general laws,
as other property, unless the charter contains a stipulation to the
contrary; and, as other property, it may be regulated, though not
destroyed, by subsequent legislation.
There is no restriction in the charter upon the power of the State
to pass these laws; they do not destroy or impair the right of
property in the franchises, are not inconsistent with their general
objects or free enjoyment, and are merely salutary regulations as
to the manner of enjoying and' exercising these franchises, prescribed by the State for the safety of its interest in this public
work, and to ensure a faithful performance of the high trust reposed
in the company by the grant. This is clearly within the constitutional power of the State.
A consideration of the well settled principles of law in reference
to the design and objects of the charter, will establish this view of
the subject. First, then, this railroad is a great public highway,
laid out by the State for the purpose of facilitating the public, both
in the travel and in the transportation of the commerce of the country. It is only on this idea, that it is a public highway, that the
State can take, or authorize the company to take, for its track, the
lands of individuals on its route. The State has no constitutional
right to take the land of one person and give it to another, to
remain private property. L. . d- Railroad Company vs. Chappel,
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1 Rice, Law R. 388; 2 Dev. & Bat. Rep. (Law) 468-9; B. & N.
R. B. B. Company vs. Casey, 2 Casey Penn. R., 308.
The State has reserved to itself the right, in its constitution, to
repeal the charter by a two-thirds vote of the legislature, and by
paying for the franchise. Con., Hart. Dig. 74, § 31. A general
law has since been passed, authorizing the State to resume the
franchises upon full compensation. Laws, 4 Leg., Extra Sess. of
1853, p. 58.
To encourage this public work, the State has provided for a loan
of six thousand dollars per mile, and has made a generous donation
of sixteen sections of land per mile. The creation of this company,
its progress with the road, and its use as it is completed, will engender rights and liabilities as to third persons for and against the
company, which may demand tegulation, and must impose a burden
on the government. These are the great interests of the State in
this public enterprise.
The State might undertake the work itself, or it may, as it has
undertaken to do in this instance, accomplish it through the instrumentality of a private corporation, created for that purpose. In
doing this it has not abandoned these great public interests, nor
has it compressed them into the narrow confines of a few sections in the charter. The corporation is created and invested with.
such powers as result from being made a corporate body, and also
with such powers, privileges and benefits as are specified in the
charter, which were supposed necessary and sufficient to enable the
company to build the road, and use it for their own profit, in the
manner designed by the charter.
This blending of a private investment for a private gain upon a
public work, was well considered in the case of Me Railroad Company vs. Davis, by the Supreme Court of North Carolinain, 2 Dev.
& Batt. Law R., 469.
They say that "an immense and beneficial revolution has been
brought about in modern times, by engaging individual enterprise,
industry and economy, in the execution of public works of internal
improvement. The general management has been left to individuals, whose private interests prompt them to conduct it beneficially
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to the public; but it is not entirely confided to them. From the
nature of their undertaking and the character of the work, they are
under sufficient responsibilities to insure the construction and preservation of the work, which: is the great object of the government.
The public interest and control are neither destroyed or suspended.
The control continues as far as it is consistent with the interests
granted, and in all cases, as far as may be necessary to the public
use. The road is a highway, although the tolls may be private
property by force of the grant of the franchise to collect them. It
is a common nuisance to allow it to become ruinous or to obstruct
it. The government may, upon sufficient cause, claim a forfeiture
of the charter, or compel the execution and repairs of the road by
those undertaking them, by any means applicable to other persons,
charged with like duties in respect to other highways."
The difference is, that the corporation, in lieu of the sovereign,
has the custody and property of the road and the collection of the
tolls, in reimbursement of the cost of construction and remuneration
for labor and cost of capital. As to the corporation, it is a franchise, like a ferry or any other. As to the public, it is a highway,
and in the strictest sense "publiciJuris."
These franchises, being private property, are amply protected,
though blended with and vested in a public work, by the spirit, if
not by the letter of our constitution. "No citizen of this State
shall be deprived of life, liberty, property or privileges, outlawed,
exiled, or in any manner disfranchised, except by due course of the
law of the land." § 16 Bill of Rights, H. D. 53; The West River
Bridge Co. vs. Dix et al., 6 Howard _U. S. Rep., 534.
Again, considering the charter as a contract, in conformity with
what is now the general doctrine, the franchises are protected by the
clause in our constitution which prohibits the enactment of "any
law impairing the obligation of contracts." When viewed in the
light of a contract, it is not as an executory, but as an executed contract, as a grant to land; and stands upon the ground that a grant
of land or the grant of a franchise implies a contract not to re-assert
the right to it. Fletcher vs. Peck, 6 Oranch, 136-7; Dartmouth
College vs. Iioodward, 4 Wheat., 652-3. But whether protected
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as property or as a contract, these franchises can only be protected
so far as they may be granted, and the charter constitute the limits
of the grant. A reference to a few decided cases may explain this.
In the leading case of Fletchler vs. Peck, an act of the Legislature
of the State of Georgia was held to be unconstitutional, under the
clause in the constitution of the United States prohibiting the States
from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts, because it
sought directly to annul a grant of land made by a previous act of
its legislature. Here the subsequent act sought to take back and
utterly destroy what was previously granted without condition or
qualification. It was not a regulation of property, or of the persons claiming it, but a deprivation of it.
In the celebrated Dartmouth College case, a corporation for literary purposes had been created by the King of England by the
grant of a charter, in which the privilege was granted, that twelve
trustees, and no more, should control the institution ; to be selected
in a particular way. The act to amend the charter, passed by N~ew
Hampshire, was decided to be unconstitutional, under this clause,
because it provided for the government of the college by more trustees than twelve, to wit, twenty-one, selected in a different way, &c.
By this and other changes, as it was said, "the charter of 1769
exists no longer. It is reorganized, and reorganized in such a manner as to convert a literary institution, moulded according to the
will of its founders, and placed under the control of private literary
men, into a machine entirely subservient to the government" (of
Iew Hampshire.) 4 Wheat. 652.
Here the act complained of operated directly on the grant, and
changed one of the terms of the grant. These are the leading cases
of the class relied on by the company. The distinction between
them and the case now under consideration is obvious, and may be
made more so, by reference to another class of equally high
authority.
In Massachusetts, the Charles River Bridge was incorporated as a
toll bridge. The charter was in ordinary form, and stipulated that
the charter should exist seventy years. Long before that time
expired, the Warren Bridge was incorporated, to be erected very
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near the former. By the terms of its charter it very soon became
a free bridge, by which the profits of the Charles" River Bridge were
entirely taken away from it. It was decided by the Supreme Court
of the United States, that the act of the legislature granting the
last charter, did not impair the obligation of the contract contained
in the charter of the first. They said, as to the rule of construction, that nothing passes by implication, and that "in charters of
this description no rights are taken from the public or given to the
corporation, beyond those which their charter, by their natural and
proper construction, purport to convey." And, as to the extent of
the powers granted, they say, that "in order to entitle themselves to
relief, it is necessary to show that the legislature contracted not to
do the act of which they complain; and that they impaired, or in
other words, violated that contract by the erectien of the Warren
Bridge. They must show that the State had entered into a contract with them, or those under whom they claim, not to establish a
free bridge at the place where the Warren Bridge is erected." 11
Peters, U. S. Rep., 539,548-9. It was held that no such contract
was expressed, or could he implied.
In the case of Providence Bank vs. Billings and .Pittman, 4
Pet., 514 it was held, that a law imposing a tax upon the bank was
valid. The charter was silent on the subject of a tax, and it was
argued that, if the State had the right to tax, it might tax so heavily
ag to render the charter useless and of no value. The act imposing
the tax, though passed subsequent to the charter, was sustained as
not impairing the obligation of the contract.
A State may take a corporation franchise for public use upon
rendering compensation without impairing the obligation of the contract. 6 How. U. S. Rep., 529; Backus vs. Lemon, 11 New
Hampshire Rep., 22. The doctrine that a private corporation is
strictly confined to its charter in ascertaining the rights and privileges granted by it, is well settled in the English courts. Canal Co.
vs. W-heeley, 2 Barnwell and Adolphus, 835.
In the case of the Ohio Life Ins. and T. Company vs. Debolt,
16 How. U. S. Rep., 437, it was decided that a State had a right
to prohibit, under a penalty, the issue of small notes by a bank, by
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a law -passed subsequent to the grant of the charter. The charter
granted the general power to issue bills and notes. Chief Justice
Taney in this case says, that "the general power to issue notes and
bills, without any express grant as to small notes, is subordinate to
the power of the State to regulate the amount for which they may
be issued."
This case establishes the right of the State to regulate banks in
their issues, so as to make them conform to its general policy as to
a sound currency. And as the banks had not anticipated and
guarded against this change of policy, by a restriction upon the
State in their charter, they had no right -to resist it.
In Mississippi an act was passed restraining banks from transferring the notes of their debtors. This right was previously enjoyed by the banks in common with other persons. The right of
the State to debar the banks from this privilege was contested, as
impairing the obligations of the contract, in their charters, which
gave a right to own, hold and dispose of their property. Chief
Justice Sharkey stated, in delivering the opinion of the Supreme
Court on this question: "It was a subject over which the legislature
had entire control when the charter was granted; and this, like all
other subjects, is subject td that control, unless a clear and positive
restriction has been imposed. The power of the Legislature is not
to be taken away by construction. If the charter had granted the
power to assign these notes, so as to enable the assignee to maintain an action in his own name, then the right would have been
beyond the control of the Idgislature. Or, if this were a power
essentially important to enable the bank to carry on its business,
and necessarily implied by the charter, then the question would be
different; but it is not. It may be very convenient for a bank to
transfer its securities, but certainly such a power is not essential to
its existence, or to its capacity to do business. A contract is not
impaired in its obligation, unless some right or privilege, which has
been granted, had been defeated or abridged." Payjne, et al. vs.
Baldwin, et al., 3 Sm. and M., 680.
In the same State a statute prohibiting banks from collecting
their debts from the time the information in the nature of a quo
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u'arrantois filed, until its determination, was sustained as constitutional. The C. B. of Rodney vs. The State of Mississippi, 4 Sm.
and Mf., 440. So, also, a statute changing the common law liability of bank debtors upon the dissolution of the corporation. Nevitt
vs. Bank of Port Gibson, 6 Sm. and M., 521 ; see also Bank of C.
vs. Att'y Gen'l, 3 Wend., 609-10.
So a statute in Massachusetts, imposing a penalty of two per
cent. per month on the amount of bills of any bank, of which payment
by such bank is refused, was held to be constitutional. Brown vs.
Penobscot Bank, 8 Mass. R., 444. These authorities will suffice to
indicate the general doctrine, that a State, upon granting a charter,
is presumed to retain its general power of legislation. Those who
claim an exemption from this general power must show, either its
relinquishment of the right to pass the law in question in the charter, or that it is inconsistent with and destructive of the particular
rights, privileges, or franchises therein enumerated and granted.
The State in this case has not relinquished'the right, by anything
set out in the charter, to require of this company to make a report
of its transactions as provided for in the act of 1853, or to require
a portion of its officers to reside in the State, as provided for by the
act of 1857. An exemption from these requisitions is not necessary to enable them to carry out the objects of the charter, which, as
a company, are to build and run the road for their own profit.
They are not inconsistent with or destructive of any grant of right
contained in the charter. Dispensing with them might be a matter
of convenience to the company; that is all; and that convenience
to themselves they have not secured in their charter. But then,
these requirements of our general railroad law of 1853, as amended
by that of 1857, stands upon still higher ground. The State has
an interest that the franchises granted shall be faithfully exercised
as a public trust, in the hands of the company, so that the work
shall progress-so that the road shall be used, as it may progress,
for the benefit of the public travel and transportation. It is interested in the honest appropriation of its bounty and loan, to which
the road is entitled under the laws. It would be derelict in the protection of these great interests if it did not require such reports of
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the company as would furnish full information of its transactions,
as required by act of 1853. And considering the rule that the residence of a corporation is in the State creating it, (13 Peters, 588,)
and that that is the proper place for its corporate business to be transacted, (Ang. and Ames on Corp., Sec. 104,) the policy of the State,
in the protection of these great public interests, may well require
that a portion of the officers, who act for and control the business
of the corporation, shall reside in the State, as has been done by
the act of 1857.
As to whether the forfeiture of the charter is not a penalty too
severe for not complying with this requisition of residence in six
months after the passage of the statute, is not a question for our
consideration. The legislatdre has determined it. It is the law.
The ground of forfeiture, that the company had failed after notice
to make the report required by the act of 1853, is not sufficiently
stated in the petition; because it is not alleged that the controller
issued the notice. The petition does not allege any meeting of the
directors out of the State since 19th of June, 1858; and the meeting of the stockholders out of the State has not been made a statutory ground of forfeiture.
The count setting up the insolvency, is too general. Bank of
Columbia vs. Attorney General, 3 Wend., 593. It does not give
the data upon which it could be concluded that the company were
certainly unable to carry out the object of the charter. The count
as to the sale of the road under the deed of trust, is insufficient,
because it does not show that the company executed the deed in any
manner to bind them, or what are the terms of the deed. It presents rather the outside facts of a public sale, proclaimed to be made
under a deed of trust, &c. It has, therefore, not become necessary
to consider the effect of the alleged sale, either by itself or in connection with any other facts. These common law grounds of forfeiture must have reference to the general objects of this public
enterprise, for which the franchises were granted.
Wherever facts are presented, which conclusively show, that the
high public trusts involved in them have been grossly abused to the
public detriment, or that the company has placed itself, or is placed
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in such irretrievable embarrassment, as to be certainly unable to
progress with the enterprise as contemplated by the charter, then
the State has a right to resume the franchises. The provision made
by the statute of 1857, for the sale and transfer of the franchises
with the road, is one mode of resumption and regrant of the franchises which it must sometimes be important to consider in this connection.
A particular discussion of this branch of the subject is not now
necessary.
Judgment is reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings.
NOTE BY T.HE JU G.-In
the decision of this case it is not necessary to examine
a question, which has been settled by the highest authority in this country, and
seems to be acquiesced in generally.

That is, whether or not the charter of incorporation is a contract, within the meaning of that clause of the constitution which
prohibits any law from being passed "impairing the obligation of contracts." Sec.
14, Bill of Rights, Hart. Dig. 52.

I desire to express it as my own opinion, that

it is not.
That clause is borrowed from a similar one in the constitution of the United States.
It was then inserted to meet and prevent a prevalent evil, which was well known at
the time, and had reference to executory contracts. A grant of a franchise is like a
grant of land. It may be construed into a contract; but it is the work of construction.

It is not treated of as a contract, and was never, as it is believed, spoken of in

that connection by those who taught, or administered the laws up to the time of
the adoption of the consitution, nor indeed up to the time of the leadixig cases of
Fletcher vs. Peck, and the Dartmouth College vs. Woodward.
This construction met with dissent when first adopted. , Its application to new
cases, as they have arisen, has met with increasing disagreement and dissent. If
carried to its legitimate conclusion, to the full extent, the State government may by
improvident legislation be deprived of many of its important powers, ceded by contract to the numerous corporations that are filling the country, without the capacity
to reclaim them, except by a revolution.

I shall content myself, now, with citing
some of the cases in which the difficulties arising out of this great question may be
seen. Dodge vs. Woolsey, 18 How. U. S. Rep., 362; The State Bank of Ohio vs.
Knoop, 16 How. U. S. R., 393, 405; 6 How. U., S. Rep., 529, 549; Charles' River
Bridge vs. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. U. S. Rep., 571, 578, 582; 4 Pet. Rep., 558; 4
Wheat., 624, 654, 665, 713; 6 Cranch, 143, 144, 145.

BLOOM vs. WELSH.

In the Supreme Court of New Jersey-June Term, 1858.
DANIEL BLOOM VS. JOSEPH WELSH.

1

1. Growing crops may be levied upon and sold as chattels under a writ ofjierifacias
de bonis, and the purchaser under such sale acquires the right of leaving the crop
upon the soil until its maturity, and also the privilege of entering upon the soil
to gather and take away the crop.
2. A judgment binds the land of the defendant from the time of its entry. But
neither the judgment nor the levy of an execution upon the land creates a lien
upon the growing crops.
3. Notwithstanding such judgment and levy upon the land, the growing crops may
be sold or may be levied upon by virtue of a subsequent execution; and such sale
or levy will be valid and operative, provided the crops are severed during the
continuance of the defendant's title and before the sale and conveyance of the
land tinder the judgment.
4. The purchaser of land under a sheriff's sale acquires, by virtue of the conveyance,
a legal title to the growing crops then upon the land against a previous purchaser
of the crops from the defendant in execution; such purchase of the crops being
made subsequent to the entry of the judgment by virtue of which the land is sold.

This action was brought in the Hunterdon Circuit Court, and was
tried at April term, 1857. The jury rendered a verdict for the
plaintiff, and assessed his damages at $156 75. Judgment on the
verdict was suspended, and, on a state of the case agreed upon by
the parties, the cause was submitted to the supreme court for an
advisory opinion. The facts appear in the opinions delivered in
this court.
The cause was argued at February term, 1858, before the Chief
Justice, and Justices Elmer, Haines, and Vredenburgh.
_iche and Beasley, for plaintiff.
Wurts, for defendant.
GREEN, CH. J.-In an action of trover to recover the value of a
lot of winter grain, the plaintiff showed title by purchase of the
growing crop from John H. Sinclair, on the 5th of November, 1855.
At the time of the sale, the farm of Sinclair, upon which the grain
I We are indebted to the courtesy of the learned reporter, A. Dutcher, Esq., for the
sheets of his third volume of reports. This case will be found at p. 177.-Ed. Am.
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was growing, was under execution by virtue of sundry judgments, and
on the 22d day of the same month of November, was sold by the
sheriff, to Welsh, the defendant, and conveyed to him by deed, on the
10th of December. No levy had been made upon the grain. The
defendant claimed the crop, as the purchaser of the land upon
which it was growing. Before the sheriff's sale, the defendant had
notice of the sale of the growing crop by Sinclair to the plaintiff,
and bid for the land, as the evidence shows, with no expectation of
purchasing the growing grain. His claim to the grain under the
purchase of the land was an after-thought. The land sold for
enough at the sheriff's sale to satisfy all the executions, and leave a
surplus to the defendant in execution. The bona ftides of the sale
of the grain by the defendant in execution to the plaintiff is not
questioned.
The justice of the case is clearly with the plaintiff. He purchased
and paid for the grain. The defendant purchased and paid for the
farm with full knowledge that the grain had been sold, and with no
expectation that the sheriff's deed would convey the crop. The
execution creditors were in nowise prejudiced. If the defendant
holds the grain, it must be by virtue of the strict rule of law. This
view of the case was presented so strongly by the evidence upon the
trial, that I was unwilling to withdraw the question from the jury,
under the belief that there existed some legal principle upon which
the plaintiff's title might be sustained. But upon a careful review
of the case, I am unable to find any principle upon which his claim
to the grain can be supported, and am satisfied that the ruling at the
circuit was erroneous.
It will not be questioned, as a well settled rule of law, that a conveyance of real estate, either by the owner or by the sheriff, under
a sale by judgment and execution, carries with it the growing crops
as an incident, unless there be an express reservation in the deed.
Terhune vs. Elberson, 2 Penn. 726; Hendricksonvs. Ivins, Saxton,
562; Foote vs. Colvin, 3 Johns. R. 222; Austin vs. Sawyer, 9 Cowen
40; Pattisonvs. Hull, 9 Cowen, 754.
And this will be the case, although there be an express agreement between the vendor and purchaser that the crops are reserved,
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and are not to pass by the deed. Parol evidence cannot be admitted to contradict or vary the terms of the deed. But in such case
equity will grant relief. ilendrickson vs. Ivins, Saxton, 562.
It is equally clear that a notice to the purchaser of the real estate
of a previous sale of the growing crops by the defendant in execution, and a misapprehension by the purchaser, of the extent of his
claim under the sheriff's sale, cannot impair the extent of his legal
rights under the deed from the sheriff. However this consideration
may affect the equity of his claim, it cannot prejudice his legal rights.
The only question in the case then is, did the defendant by his
purchase of the land under the sheriff's deed, acquire a legal title
to the growing crops, as against a previous bona fide purchaser of
the crops from the defendant in execution, such purchase being
made subsequent to the rendition of the judgment upon which the
execution issued. At common law, growing crops, raised annually
by labor and cultivation, are personal property. As such, they go
to the executor, and not to the heir. Toller on Executors, 150;
Ram on Assets, 186; 1 Williams on Executors, 596; Matthews on
Executors, 26.
They may be sold and conveyed as chattels by parol. A contract for their sale is not a contract for the sale of an interest in
land under the statute of frauds and perjuries. Evans vs. Boberts,
5 Barn. & Or. 829; Jones vs. Flint, 10 Ad. & E. 758; Austin vs.
Sawyer, 9 Cowen, 89; Green vs. Armstrong, 1 Denio, 550; 2
Greenl. Ev. § 271.
Like other chattels, they may be taken in execution and sold
under a ft. fa. de bonis. Peacock vs. Purvis, 2 Brod. &Bing. 362;
.Eaton vs. Southby, Willes, 131; Sewell's Sheriff, 285; Watson's
Sheriff, 180; Whipple vs. Foote, 2 Johns. R. 418; Stewart vs.
.Doughty, 9 Johns. R. 108; Westbrook vs. Jager,1 Harr. 81.
And the purchaser of growing grain under such executions
acquires the right of leaving the grain upon the soil until its maturity,
and also the privilege of entering to gather and take away the crop.
So the owner of the soil may sell the growing crops as chattels.
Such sale will operate as a severance, and the purchaser of the crop
will hold against a subsequent purchaser of the land upon which it
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is growing, from the owner. W'estbrook vs. Eager, 1 Harr. 81;
Stewart vs. Doughty, 9 Johns. R. 108; Austin vs. Sawyer, 9
Cowen, 39.
In applying these principles to the case under consideration, it
is clear that, if the sale of the growing crops had been made previous
to the entry of the judgment under which the land was subsequently
sold, the purchaser of the crops would have held them by a valid
title. The sale of the crops would have operated as a severance,
would have vested a complete title in the purchaser, with the right
of entering on the land to gather and take them away. The subsequent levy on the land must have been made subject to this incumbrance, and the incumbrance would continue on the land in the
hands of the purchaser under the execution. The sheriff's deed for
the land would not, under such circumstances, vest in the grantee
any title to the growing crops, because at the date of the judgment
there had been a severance. The crops were no longer an incident
of the realty, and would not pass by a conveyance of the land.
But here the sale of the growing crops was made subsequent to the
entry of the judgment, and it remains to inquire what effect, under
our statutes, the lien of the judgment upon the land, and the subsequent sale and conveyance thereof by the sheriff, had upon the
title to the growing crops'
A judgment binds the land of the defendant from the entry of the
judgment, but it does iiot bind chattels. Nix. Dig. 722, § 2. Nor
does a levy of an execution upon the land create a lien upon the
growing crops, so far, at least, as to prevent a sale of them by the
defendant to a bona fide purchaser, or a levy upon them by virtue
of a subsequent execution. If the crop be gathered and removed
before the sale of the land, the case is entirely free from difficulty.
The judgment creditor may at any time, if he see fit, levy as well
upon the growing erops as upon the land, and thus acquire a legal
right to them. But in the absence of such levy, the lien of the
judgment upon the real estate will not interfere with the disposition
.of the growing crops by the defendant in execution, provided they
:are severed during the continuance of the defendant's- title. The
purchaser of mortgaged premises, sold under a decree of foreclosure

BLOOM vs. WELSH.

and sale, is entitled to the crops sown by the mortgagor and growing
at the time of the sale, as against a purchaser of the crops from the
mortgagor or under an execution against the mortgagor. Howell
vs. Schenck, 4 Zab. 90; 8'hepard vs. Philbric, 2 Denio, 174.
But the title of the mortgagee is quite distinct in character from
that of the judgment creditor. He has a legal estate in the mortgaged premises; he may recover in ejectment; the crops as well as
the land are security for the mortgage debt. Neither the mortgagor nor his lessee is entitled to emblements, as against the mortgagee. Coote on Mort. 343. But the lien of a judgment upon the
land has no such efficacy.
In Stambaugh vs. Yate8, 2 Rawle, 161, it was held, by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, that where, after an execution was
levied upon land, grain was sown upon it, which was levied on and
sold at the suit of another creditor, and the land was subsequently
sold under the first fierifacia, such sale of the grain was an implied
severance, and the grain did not pass by a sale of the land. And
the principle of that case is recognized in Bear vs. Bitzer, 16 Penn.
St. R. 178.
It was held, in the latter case, that if the sale of the land was
made while the grain remained the property of the judgment debtor,
it passed to the sheriff's vendee, as appurtenant to the land; and if
the right of the respective creditors rested alone upon the legal
effect of the levy upon the crops and the land respectively, these
decisions are in accordance with sound principle.
Bat, by theprovisions of our statute, making lands liable to be
sold for the payment of debts, (Nix. Dig. 723, § 8,) the sheriff, by
whom lands are sold under execution, is required to make to the
purchaser as good a deed as the defendant in execution could have
made for the same at the time of, rendering judgment; which deed,
the statute declares, shall vest in the purchaser as perfect an estate
in the premises as the defendant in execution was entitled to at the
date of the judgment, and as fully as if he had himself sold the land,
and received the purchase money. It was held in Den vs. Steelman,
5 Halst. 199, that the sheriff's deed takes effect only from delivery,
and that no estate vests in the purchaser until that time, but that
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the purchaser, under the provision of the statute, takes as good an
estate as the defendant had at the time of the judgment; so that no
subsequent lien or alienation should have effect. To give effect to
this provision of the statute, it must be held that the lessee or vendee of the defendant in execution (the lease or sale being subsequent
to the judgment) can have no right to the way-going crop, as against
the purchaser of the land at the sheriff's sale. To permit the
defendant in execution to assign the way-going crop upon land subject to judgment, would enable him to transfer to others rights not
vested in himself, and would impair the extent and efficacy of the
security which the legislature designed to confer upon the judgment
creditor. The relation of the sheriff's deed to the date of the judgment cannot operate to avoid any use or alienation of the growing
crops by the defendant in execution prior to the sheriff's sale. As
has been said, the judgment creates no lien upon the growing crops.
They may be lawfully used or aliened by the tenant, provided they
mature and are severed during the continuance of his title. But if
they continue upon the land at the time of the sale and conveyance
by the sheriff, there being then no severance in fact, and no severance in law prior to the entry of the judgment, the title to the crops
passes with the conveyance of the land. This being the position of
the crops now in controversy, they passed to the defendant under
the -sheriff's deed. The plaintiff has no legal title to them.
Let the circuit court be advised that the verdict should be set
aside, and judgment of nonsuit entered.
ELMER, J.
Growing crops are chattels, and pass by a parol sale,
Vestbroqk vs. Eager, I Harr. 81, but they are so far annexed to
the soil that they pass by a deed which does not except them.
Terhune vs. Elberson., 2 Penn. 726. A deed from Sinclair to the
defendant, made at the time the sheriff's deed was made, would not
have conveyed the grain, because -it had been previously sold to the
plaintiff. But by the express provisions of the eighth section of the
act making lands liable to be sold for the payment of debts, (Nix.
Dig. 728,) a sheriff's deed relates back to the date of the judgment,
and it is declared that it shall vest in the purchaser as good and
perfect an estate as the defendant in execution was entitled to at
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and before the judgment, as fully and to all intents and purposes as
if the said defendant had sold the lands and made the deed. The
title of the defendant was therefore paramount to that of the plaintiff,
and the case comes within the ruling in the case of Howell vs.
Schenck, 4 Zab. 89.
It was held by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the case
of Stambaugh vs. Yates, 2 Rawle, 161, that where there was a
judgment and ft. fa. against land, and another creditor obtained an
execution against goods, upon which crops growing on the land were
sold, and then the land was sold by virtue of a venditioni exponas,
that the crops passed by the first sale, and the court said the
defendant might have sold them himself. But the Pennsylvania
statute does not make the sheriff's deed relate back, as ours does.
It was held in Bear vs. Bitzer, 16 Penn. St. R. 175, that when
the crops have not been previously sold, the sheriff's deed will pass
them.
The facts given in evidence, showing that the defendant knew
before he purchased at the sheriff's sale that the plaintiff had bought
the grain, and that the sale paid off all the executions against Sinclair, cannot affect the defendant's title. The plaintiff, could not
have been permitted to show, if such had been the fact, that the
grain was verbally reserved, because the deed must speak for itself.
and cannot be changed by parol evidence. Gibbons vs. Dillingham,
5 Eng. Ark. R. 9; Howell vs. Schenck, 4 Zab. 89. The defendant's
knowledge of a previous sale of the grain did not prevent him from
being a purchaser, or make his rights, as such, different from those
of any other person. That the property paid off all the executions,
may serve to show that the sale by Sinclair of the grain was not
fraudulent. But the defendant's title does not depend upon that of
the plaintiff's being fraudulent or otherwise invalid of itself, but
upon the law, which makes the sheriff's deed relate back to the date
of the judgment, obviously for the purpose of thereby cutting off all
subsequent alienations and incumbrances. If Sinclair had made a
deed to the plaintiff for a fair and valuable consideration, and the
plaintiff bad had no actual knowledge of the judgment, it cannot be
doubted, I think, that the title under the sheriff's deed would be
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paramount to the other, and supersede it entirely. A parol sale of
the grain cannot, I think, give any better claim than a conveyance
by a deed would.
I am therefore of opinion that, upon the facts stated, the plaintiff
cannot maintain his action, and that the circuit court should be
advised to order judgment of nonsuit.
Justices Haines and Yredenburgh concurred.

BYRON DIMAN vs. THE PROVIDENCE, WARREN,

AND

BRISTOL RAILROAD

COMPANY.'
1. To enable a court of equity, upon the ground of mistake, to reform a written
contract, the mistake must be proved to be the mistake of both parties; so that,
by correcting the writing as requested, the court will make it express the contract designed to be entered into by both.

A court of equity may, however,
rescind and cancel a contract upon the ground of a mistake of facts, material to
the contract, of one party only; but where there has been no fraud or surprise to
put the applicant for such relief off his guard, it must appear that the mistake
was not the consequence of his own want of recollection, from inattention, or of
his own carele-sness ; and that by granting him the relief he asks, no injustice,
and especially from the applicant's neglect to apprise him of the mistake, will be
done to the other party to the contract.
2. Hence a subscriber to the stock of a railroad company, chartered, but waiting for
subscriptions in order to organize under its charter, can have no relief in a court
of equity, on the ground, that when intending merely to renew an old subscription
to the stock, which had fallen through, he, by some unaccountable mistake, subscribed for double the amount; such subscriber ascertaining his mistake immediately after his subscription, and suffering the company to organize and act
upon the faith of his subscription, during several months, without notice of his
alleged mistake.

Bill in equity, to reform a subscription of $2,000 to the capital stock
of the Providence, Warren, and Bristol Railroad Company, upon
the ground, that the same was made by the mistake of the complainant, when intending to subscribe for $1,000 only of said stock;
and to stay an action at law, brought by the railroad company
We are indebted to 2 Ames' R. I. Rep. p. 130, for this case.
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against the complainant, to recover the amount of said subscription,
and for general relief.
It was proved that the complainant, in the year 1852, subscribed
$1,000 to the stock of this railroad; but that the subscription fell
through, because the whole amount subscribed was insufficient
to make the subscription binding according to its terms. In
the spring of 1858, another attempt was made to obtain subscriptions adequate in amount to enable the company, which had been
chartered, to organize under its charter, and proceed with the undertaking for which it had been incorporated. Accordingly, several
little subscription books were placed in the hands of the friends of
the project, each of which was headed with the following printed form
of subscription contract, pasted upon the first page of the book,
underieath which, and on the succeeding pages of the book,
the names of the subscribers, with the number of shares and amount in
money subscribed by each, set opposite to their names, were to be
written. "We, the subscribers, severally agree to and with the
Providence, Warren, and Bristol Railroad Company, that we will
take the number of shares of one hundred dollars each in the capital stock of said company set opposite our respective names, under
the provisions of its charter and any amendments thereto, made by
the general assembly of this State; and that we will pay for the
same in such manner as the said Providence, Warren, and Bristol
Railroad Company, when duly organized, may, under its charter
and any amendments thereto, direct; Provided, that this subscription shall not be binding unless there are one hundred and seventyfive thousand dollars of the stock subscribed by responsible parties."
One of these subscription books, with but one previous subscription
upon it, was brought to the complainant at his house, by a friend
and relative, Hon. F. M. Dimond, to obtain his subscription to it;
when, after some urgency to renew his subscription at least, if not to
increase it, both of which the complainant at first refused to do, the
complainant at last consented to renew his subscription, and taking
the book to his desk, with his own hand wrote in it underneath the
above printed form of engagement, his name, and opposite to his
name, in the appropriate spaces, the figures "20," for the number
of hares, and "2,000," for the amount in money, of his subscrip-
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tion. After drying the ink at the fire, the complainant handed the
book back to his visitor, who, without examining it in his presence,
left immediately, and shortly after handed the book to others, as is
common, to obtain other subscriptions from those with whom they
are supposed to have the most influence. On the same day, the
complainant casually heard of the amount of his subscription, which
he at first denied, and on the next day, or within a day or two,
called upon F. M. Dimond, who had brought the book to him, to
correct his mistake, saying that he had only intended to renew his
old subscription. He was informed by Mr. Dimond that he had
handed the book to others, and that it was not in his possession ;
but that if it were, he would rectify the mistake, and subsequently
that he would see the committee and have the matter put right.
The mistake however, never was rectified ; but upon the faith of this,
and other subscriptions, to the requisite charter amount, on the 16th
day of April, 1853, the railroad company was organized, and proceeded to make contracts and incur expenses in construction of their
road, &c. Although it would seem to have been understood between
the complainant and Mr. Dimond, who had procured his subscription, that early steps should be taken by the latter to apprize the
officers of the company of the mistake, and to endeavor to induce
them to rectify it, no steps were in fact taken until some time in the
summer or fall of 1853, and no written communication was made to
them upon the subject, by either, until the 6th day of December,
1853. The officers of the company then declined to correct the
mistake, if it were such, upon the ground that earlier application
should have been made to them to do so, if at all; and, the complainant refusing to pay the calls upon his subscription, an action was
commenced against him by the company to enforce payment of them ;
to enjoin which, and to procure the other relief prayed for, as above
stated, this bill was filed.
There was some proof tending to show that the complainant had
professed a willingness to double his subscription, and had on one
occasion stated that he had actually done so; but there was some
indistinctness as to whether this might not have related to the first
subscription; the complainant, who was a witness, positively deny-
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ing it, and insisting that he had reluctantly consented even to renew
his subscription.
Win. H. Potter, for the complainant:
Courts of equity have power to reform contracts in writing and
correct mistakes in them, admitting parol testimoney for the purpose.
1 Story, Eq. §§ 140, 152, 156, 158 ; Graves vs. Boston Ins. Co., 2
Cranch, 419, 444; Andrews vs. Essex Fire & Mar. Ins. Co., 3
Mason, 10 ; Delaware Ins. 0o. vs. Hogan, 2 Wash. 0. 0. R., 5;
Keisselbrack vs. Livingston, 4 Johns. Ch. R. 148.
Courts of equity will grant relief against written contracts, not
only when the proof is express, but also when it is fairly implied
from the nature of the transaction. 1 Story, Eq. 162, .168; Le
Roy vs. Platt,4 Paige, Ch.R., 79 ; Gouverneur vs. Titus, 1 Edw.
Ch. R., 477; 2 U. S. Eq. Dig., 286, 288, 289.
Hayes and Blake, for the respondent:
1st. The complainant is not entitled to have the written contract
of subscription varied and reformed, as prayed for, because he has
not proved the mistake alleged.
Courts of equity will grant relief by reforming written instruments, only where there is a plain mistake, clearly made out by
satisfactory proofs, "and will not act" wherever the evidence is
loose, equivocal, or contradictory, or it is in its texture open to
doubt, or merely affords a presumption. 1 Story,. Eq, § 157 ;
Gillespie vs. Moore, 2 Johns. Oh. R., 595, 597; Lyman vs. United
Ins. Co., Ib. 630; Taylor vs. Fleet, 4 Barb. S. C., 95; United
States vs. -Munroe, 5 Mason, 572; Goldsborough vs. Ringgold, 1
Md. Ch.Decis., 289; Griswold vs. Smith, 10 Verm., 452; Oleaveland
vs. Burt, 11 lb. 138; Lyman vs. Little, 15 Ib.476; Preston vs.
Whitcomb, 17 Ib.188 ; Reese vs. Wyman, 9 Geo., 430 ; Townshend
vs. Stangroom, 6 Yes., 328, 339 ; Henkle vs. Royal Assurance Co.
I Yes., 317.
2d. Admitting the mistake alleged, the complainant is not entitled
to have it corrected, because it must have arisen from his own negligence. The rule is, that in order to entitle the party to relief in
equity, the mistake must be as to a fact of such a nature, that the
party could not, by reasonable diligence, get knowledge of it when

DIMAN vs. RAILROAD COMPANY.

put upon inquiry. Taylor vs. leet, 4 Barb. Sup. Ct., 95; 1 Story,
Eq. §§ 105, 146 ; Wood vs. Patterson,4 Md. Ch. Dec., 335 ; Marine
Ins. Co. vs. Hodgson, 7 Cranch, 386; Lamb vs. Harris,8 Geo., 546.
3d. The relief sought should be denied, because the mistake (if
any) arose without any fault on the part of the defendant or even of
F. M. Dimond. If the parties act fairly, and it is not a case where
one is bound to communicate the facts to the other, upon the ground
of confidence or otherwise, then the court will not interfere. 1 Story
Eq. §§ 147, 148, 150, 151.
4th. If the mistake were proved, and the complainant entitled to
relief upon other grounds, the contract should not be altered in this
case, because the complainant has been guilty of culpable negligence,
in not sooner disclosing the mistake to the defendants.
5th. This contract cannot be varied or reformed without unjustly
affecting the rights of other parties. A mistake in a written contract will not be corrected to the prejudice of innocent parties who
had no notice of thi mistake. United States vs. Munroe, 5 Mason,
572; Resler vs; Zimmersechitte, 1 Texas, 50. This is analogous to
the principle, that a court of equity will interfere, in cases of mistake
in written instruments, only as between the original parties and
those claiming under them in priority. 1 Story Eq. § 165.
AmEs, 0. J. A court of equity has no power to alter or reform
an agreement made between parties, since this would be in truth a
power to contract for them; but merely to correct the writing executed as evidence of the agreement, so as to make it express what the
parties actually agreed to. It follows, that the mistake which it
may correct in such writing must be, as it is usually expressed, the
mistake of both parties to it; that is, such a mistake in the drafting of the writing, as makes it convey the intent or meaning of
neither party to the contract. If the court were to reform the
writing to make it accord with the intent of one party only to the
agreement, who averred and proved that he signed it, as it was
written, by mistake, when it exactly expressed the agreement as
understood by the other party, the writing when so altered, would
be just as far from expressing the agreement of the parties
as it was before; and the court would have been engaged in
the singular office, for a precisely equal wrong to the other. Henkle
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vs. Te RoyaZ Exchange Assurance Co., 1 Yes. Sen., 317; The
Marquis of Townshend vs. Stangroom, 6 Yes., 833, 384; Adams
Eq. 171.
Now the parties to this contract df subscription, which we are
asked to reform so as to make it a subscription for one thousand
dollars instead of two, are, as the parties to the bill indicate and suppose, the subscriber, on the one side, and the railroad
company, whose capital stock he subscribed to, on the other.
Francis M. Dimond, who handed the subscription book to the complainant, and as a friend and neighbor urged him to subscribe, so
far from being a party to the complainant's contract of subscription,
in the sense of the party with whom he contracted, appears himself,
about the same time to have entered into a several contract with
that same party, the railroad company, for the same amount of its
stock, by writing his name on the same subscription-book directly
below the name of the eomplainant, as a'subscriber, for twenty shares
of it. In other words, each thus contracted, not with the other, but
with a corporation, existing, but not yet organized, to take the number 6f shares of stock set opposite his name, provided responsible
subscriptions to the amount of $175,000 could be obtained; and
when these were obtained, and the railroad company upon the faith
of them proceeded to organize and to act, the subscription contract
of each with the company became perfect and mutually binding both
upon the subscribers and the company, as the respective parties to
the contract.
To enable us, then, to correct this subscription paper in the mode
requested by the complainant on the ground of mistake, we must be
satisfied, that by so doing we shall make it conform to the understanding of the contract by the railroad company at the time they
entered into it, as well as of the complainant at the time that he
subscribed it. Now there is no evidence that the company, as an
organized body, or any officer or agent of the company appointed to
represent it, had any notice whatever at the time of the organization, that this subscription was not precisely what the complainant
designed it to be; nor indeed does it seem that any effectual means
were taken to apprize them that it was not, until long after, when,
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according to a previous promise to the complainant, Francis M.
Dimond addressed to the president of the company a letter under
the date of December 6, 1853, some nine months after the organization of the company, and received the proper reply, that the company
having acted upon the subscription of the complainant, it was too
late to allow him to retract it.
So far, then, is this from having been a mistake of both parties to
the contract, that it is the mistake, if it may be so called, of one
only; the other having been suffered to act and contract during
many months upon the faith that the subscription was precisely what
it was designed to be, and no diligence whatever used to give notice
to the contrary. If there was, as it would seem, negligence on the
part of Francis M. Dimond in performing his promise to the complainant, that he would give early notice to the company of the facts
concerning this subscription, as they are now claimed to be, which
might have been done on the very day that the company met for
organization, it was the negligence of the agent of the complainant,
and he, and not the company, must bear the consequences of it.
Without, therefore, going into the question whether, considering
the grounds of the well-known rule of evidence, it would be proper,
however competent, to alter a written contract, unambiguous in its
terms, upon oral proof alone of a supposed mistake in them, and
such proof consisting almost wholly in the testimony of the party
applying for the alteration, we must decline to reform this subscription in the mode proposed, upon the distinct ground, that it is not
competent for us thus to make it express the contract of one party,
when, by so doing, we shall make it cease to express the contract
which the other party fairly entered into, and so long acted upon.
But besides the power to reform a writing, so as to make it
express the agreement of both parties as it was designed to do, a
court of equity has also power to rescind and cancel an agreement
at the request of one party, upon the ground that, without negligence, he entered into it through a mistake of facts material to the
contract, when it can do so without injustice to the other party.
Although relief of this character has not been specially asked of us,
and indeed, the complainant has already paid half of this subscription as the condition of a former continuance of the suit at law
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against him by the respondents to recover the whole of it, it may
not be improper for us to add, that the case of the complainant,
even as he claims it to be proved, would not entitle him to this relief.
There was no mistake here at all, in the sense in which a court
of equity recognizes it in order to relief. The complainant, at ease in
the library of his own house, after having been urged by a friend to
double, or at least to renew his subscription, with his own hand
deliberately subscribes his name in the book before him, setting
opposite to his name in figures, the number of shares (20), and the
amount in money (82,000), which he engages to take in the stock
of this railroad. Grant that he designed, and at the time expressed
the design, of renewing only his old subscription of a thousand dollars ;. yet it is not possible to account for his actual subscription
otherwise than by supposing, either, that at the moment he had forgotten what the amount of his old subscription was, or, that he
wrote this subscription with a mind so pre-occupied with something
else that he did not attend to what he wrote. As a witness he does
not attempt to account for it; but merely states the fact, that designing one thing, he did another. Now as the complainant, so far from
being weak or hallucinated, is eminent amongst us for his knowledge
and employment in affairs both private and public, nothing but want
of recollection or attention, which necessarily import in such a personal act, negligence or carelessness on his part, could have permitted his hand to write what his will did not direct. When in addition to this it is considered, that notwithstanding his discovery of
his negligence on the same day, there seems to have been equal
negligence on his part, or what is the same thing, on the part of F.
M. Dimond, his agent, in rectifying the error caused by it, and in
aftevwards apprizing the railroad company of it, so that, as far as
we can learn from the testimony, months elapsing, the corporation
was not only organized, but contracted for the consituction of their
railroad long before notice was given of his mistake to their officers,
it will be seen, at once, that there is no pretence for this species of
relief, whether we look at the neglect of the complainant, or the
injustice which relief against it would cause to the respondents. In
cases like this, where there. -has been no intermixture of fraud .or
surprise to put the applicant for relief off his guard, -we must invent
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a new head of equity before we can interpose to save him, to the injury
of others, against the effects of his own carelessness.
The bill must be dismissed, with costs.

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelpia.
THE NORTH PENNSYLVANIA

RAILROAD COMPANY vs. DANIEL STONE.

1. It is a power implied in every grant of municipal authority, to dig up the streets
and highways for the purpose of securing drainage and sewerage essential and
convenient to the public health.
2. The city of Philadelphia possesses this power, by express legislative enactment
as to Front street, both by the legislation in regard to the districts of Northern
Liberties and Kensington, and by the Consolidation Act.
9. A railroad corporation cannot, under a grant of franchises to construct and
maintain a railroad track in a city street or highway, have the exclusive use of
that street and oust jurisdiction for municipal purposes; and therefore, an injunction to restrain an agent of the city, a city contractor, who proposes to take
up temporarily a portion of the railway track in order to build a culvert in such
public street, will be refused.

This was a motion for a special injunction to restrain the defendant from taking up a portion of plaintiffs' road for the purpose of
culverting Cohocksink Creek.
ALLISON, J.-The complainants charge that the defendant has
threatened to take up that portion of their railroad constructed upon
the line of Germantown road, from Front to Second street, and ask
that he may be restrained by injunction from so doing.
The defendant in his affidavit, admits the truth of the complaint;
but sets up, by way of justification, that he has contracted with the
City of Philadelphia to build a culvert upon Germantown road between the points designated, and that in so doing it will be necessary
to remove the railway of complainants from the bed of said road.
The culvert referred to is for the purpose of covering-in Cohocksink creek, and to afford the necessary drainage and sewerage to
that portion of the city of Philadelphia through which it passes.
It will not be necessary, in determining the question raised by the
bill and answer, to inquire how far the City of Philadelphia can,
under the general implied power conferred upon her as a municipal
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corporation, proceed to dig up the public streets and highways of
the city for the purpose of securing the requisite underground drainage and sewerage so essential to the convenience and health of over
half a million of people. It, perhaps, would not be difficult to
establish this as a power necessarily implied in every grant of municipal authority as broad as that conferred by the supreme legislature upon the city of Philadelphia. But we are saved this necessity, from the fact of the grant of express power to perform the
work in question in terms which .require its execution as a duty
charged upon the councils of the city.
Germantown road, from Front street to Cohocksink creek, is
within the limits of the late District of the Northern Liberties, and
from Cohocksink creek to Second street, is embraced within the
former District of Kensington. These Districts, by the Act of Consolidation, having merged in the city of Philadelphia, their rights
and powers vested at the same time, which clothed the new corporation with every privilege and incident-which belonged to the old,
and not affected by the legislation of that or any subsequent time.
An inquiry into the law as it stood prior to the consolidation of the
city and districts becomes therefore important.
By the act of April 16, 1829, it was provided, that it should be
lawful for the corporation through which Cohocksink creek should
run or bound, to erect a culvert along said creek, if at any time
thereafter they should deem it necessary. And by the Act of
February 20th, 1851, the Commissioners of Kensington, the Northern Liberties and the county of Philadelphia, were authorized and
required to put under contract a culvert along said creek, from
Front street to Sixth street, for the purpose of draining off the water
of said creek, and to that end authority was given to construct said
culvert, along any street or road laid out in the District of Kensington or the Northern Liberties. And by a further act of Assembly,
passed the 27th of April, 1852, the right was given to construct a
second or branch culvert (which is a part of the present undertaking)
in any street suitable for the purpose, in such manner as would best
secure the drainage of the water of the creek from Sixth street to
Front street.
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A mere statement of these several acts of the State legislature is
all That is required, in order to exhibit the clear and undoubted right
of the city to prosecute the work of culverting Cohocksink creek, as
it is now proposed shall be done by the defendant, acting as the
agent of the city, unless it can be made to appear that his right has
been taken away by. the same authority by which it was originally
granted. This the complainants say, has been done by the act of
April 8tb, 1852, incorporating them with power to construct a railroad, "beginning at any point north of Vine street, in the county
of Philadelphia, and thence by the most expeditious and practicable
route, to or near the borough of Easton," &c. Is this claim well
founded? and can it be supported upon the basis upon which the
complainants are content to rest it? We think not, and that it
conflicts with one or two well settled legal principles, which we will
state briefly. The first is, that where in a subsequent act in favor
of a private corporation, it is sought to control the general powers
granted to a public corporation, the intention of the legislature
ought distinctly to appear; and any ambiguity in the grant must be
construed against a private, and in favor of a public corporation.
Thus we find the principle expounded, in the Commissioners vs.
Gas Company, 2 Jones, 321. See also the cases there cited. So
also in the Trenton Water Company, 6 Penna. Law Jour., 32, it is
said, that private corporations take their franchises subject to the
rights of individuals and communities; and the strong presumption
of law is always against unconditional, adverse privileges.
The complainants in this case are a private corporation; and
although a railroad is in a certain sense a highway, which the public have
the right to enjoy, yet for all purposes of pecuniary'gain or advantage,
including the ownership of the road and all that belongs to it, it is
strictly a private corporation. We have thus the private interest
of the complainants arrayed against, not merely the general
or implied powers of the city, but against a clear and express grant,
in which there is no shadow of ambiguity, and in which nothing is
left to implication; and this claim, having no other foundation than
the grant to construct a railway over and along the street in dispute.
It is not to be forgotten, that this power, specially conferred upon
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the district of Kensington and Northern Liberties, stood upon the
statute books unrepealed when the act incorporating the complainants was passed, of which they had, or are presumed to have had,
full and ample notice; and therefore when the corporate franchises
were accepted by them, it was with knowledge, that the enjoyment
of those franchises, would be subject to such interruption,
as would be necessary, in the erection or construction of the culvert,
along this portion of Germantown road. There isnothing inconsistent in the grant of powers claimed by both bodies corporate.
The pbwers conferred, are in substantial harmony with each other,
subject to such reasonable restraint as may be temporarily necessary,
in order that that may be done for which the authority is so clear
and ample. And in this, the complainants suffer no greater hardship than do the public, who, at all times have the right to a free
and unobstructed passage along the high'rays of the city, when such
highways, are for the time being, torn up, and thetravel suspendedr
whilst necessary municipal improvements are in progress of construction.
The second principle upon which we rest our conclusion is, that
corporations possess only such powers as are specifically granted, or
such as are necessary- to carry into effect the powers expressly
granted. Being a political institution, it has no other capacities
than those that are necessary to carry into effect the purposes for
which it was established. Or, to use the language of Judge Black as
applicable to complainants, in the Commonwealth vs. The Railroad,
2 Casey, 351, that which a company is authorized to do, by its act
of incorporation, it may do; beyond that its acts are illegal. A
doubtful charter, says the Chief Justice, does not exist, because
whatever is doubtful is decisively certain against the corporation.
Keeping this principle in view, we look in vain to the charter of the
North Pennsylvania Railroad Company for any such grant of power
as is claimed by them. There is no exclusive use of the streets of
the city to be extracted from the letter or evident intent of the law;
certainly no language, that in terms ousts the jurisdiction of the city
for all requisite municipal purposes, or that can be construed into a
repeal of the several laws, authorizing the culverting of Cohocksink

